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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONTRACTS: A CONTRACT MAY NOT BE RESCINDED IN
VIOLATION OF ITS TERMS-The facts in Carleno Coal Sales,
Inc. v. Ramsey Coal Company 1 are simple. The defendant coal
producer entered a written contract under which the plaintiff sales
company was to have an exclusive distributorship of all coal produced by the defendant. The contract was to continue for five
years with an option for the plaintiff to renew the contract for an
additional five years. The dispute in the case arose over a clause
in the contract providing for cancellation of the contract for failure
or breach by one of the parties. The provision stated that in such
event "the party not at fault may give the defaulting party 60
days' written notice" of intent to cancel because of such breach.
The party notified would then have 60 days to correct Such default
or breach in order to avoid cancellation of the contract.
In trial to the court there was ample evidence that the plaintiff failed to perform his obligations under the contract. The defendant, without following the above-mentioned provision for cancellation, simply wrote the plaintiff that the agency was terminated
as of that time, and he then began sales to other companies. The
plaintiff sued for damages arising from the breach of contract.
There are really two issues presented by this case. The first
is one of interpretation of the contract; when the provision for
cancellation said "may", did it really mean "shall" or "must". The
second issue is a question of law; may an agency which has been
created to continue over a definite term be revoked for good cause,
but contrary to the terms of contract providing for revocation,
without subjecting the revoking party to liability for such a
breach?
Problems of construction of an instrument are usally troublesome. In this case the trial court held that the word "may" was
used in a simple permissive sense and that the provision therefore
merely provided one method by which alleged breaches or defaults
might be ironed out. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed this
interpretation on appeal, holding that "may" meant "shall" or
"must" for the reason that if the method of notice outlined in the
provision were merely optional, it created no rights or duties and
was, therefore, without purpose and "mere surplusage." The court
reasoned that unless the procedure were to be obligatory, its recital added nothing to the contract and such an interpretation would
violate the presumption that "each part of a contract has a purpose, and a construction which gives legal effect to every part
thereof . . ." The ultimate significance of this part of the case is
a lesson for those drafting contracts not to use the word "may"
I ---Colo ......
270

P. 2d 755, 1953-4 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 321.
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when they mean "must." This case represents a rather expensive
cure for ambiguous drafting.
The second issue in this case involves more nearly a question
of pure law. The confusion evolves primarily from the attempt to
transform a well-settled rule in agency law into a principle of contract law which rests on entirely separate considerations. It is
well settled that the courts willnot enforce an agency relationship
(which is essentially a fiduciary one) over the protest of either
party irrespective of the original duration envisaged. Phrased a
little differentlyAn agency created for a definite term may nevertheless be rightfully revoked before its scheduled date of
expiration, without liability on the part of the principal,
where the agent2 fails to perform faithfully his express or
implied duties.
While the above rule is unquestionably good agency law, it in
no way abridges the rights of contracting parties to render themselves liable for failure to follow any specified procedure stipulated
to be binding on the parties. In this case the liability of the defendant in no way rested on the agency relationship, but was based
entirely on a contractual agreement. as to measures to be followed
in the event that the agency relation were to be terminated. The
Court cited American Jurisprudence for a statement of the rule
by a
that the right to cancel an agency contract may be restricted
3
stipulation in the contract creating the agency relationship. With
this contract law in mind, perhaps the agency rule could be clarified by a statement to the effect that a mere stipulation that an
agency contract is to continue over a stated term does not subject
the parties to liability in the event it is revoked prematurely for
good cause. Such liability may, however, be fixed by the contract
creating the agency. The ultimate lesson evolving from this dispute is that in determining possible liability in an anticipated
breach, the party should look carefully to both the laws of agency
and the laws of contract.
J. BELKNAP

DAMAGES-A WIFE CANNOT RECOVER IN A TORT ACTION FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT BY HER HUSBAND-The
answer to the question of a wife's right to a cause of action for
loss due to injuries resulting to her husband through the negligence of a third party has been reiterated and perhaps extended
in the case of Weng v. Scheiger.' In this case the plaintiff, her son
and! her husband were passengers in an automobile which was
struck from behind by the defendant's truck. There was little
doubt that the accident was caused by the carelessness of the driver
-2 c.i.s. 1157.
'AMtERICAN JIRISPRUDENCE 45, § 49.
'..
Colo.. , 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Slh.
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of the truck. In an amended complaint the husband did not participate as a plaintiff, but his wife alleged that he was permanently
injured as a result of which she lost his support and companionship to her damage in the sum of $50,000. She also alleged
damages due to injuries to herself in the sum of $50,000. The jury
awarded $8,000 to the plaintiff in its verdict.
Over objection, the trial court submitted a special interrogatory to the jury directed to a finding of a separate amount for the
loss of support of plaintiff's husband. The interrogatory was returned without answer and upon question the foreman of the jury
stated that no damages were found for loss of support. The
Supreme Court held that the question was improperly before the
court and jury and that the error was aggravated by the submission of the special interrogatory to the jury which emphasized the
question which easily could have been reflected in an excessive
verdict. The errors were not cured by a failure on the part of the
jury to answer the interrogatory or make a finding as to such
damages, and because of these errors and others, the case was reversed and sent back for new trial.
Since the case of Giggey v. Galagher Transportation Company 2 the Colorado courts have recognized the rule that a wife
cannot recover for the loss of consortium of her husband because
of injuries resulting from the negligence of a third party. In that
case the husband recovered and the Court said that his recovery
precluded a double recovery for the same injury or wrong in an
action by the wife. In the present case, however, the husband made
no claim to recover so that the theory of double recovery is inapplicable. The plaintiff argued that support, meaning monetary
remuneration, is not recognized as a part of consortium by standard definitions 3 and accordingly cannot be inferred.
In the case of Franzen v. Zimmerman 4 the Supreme Court
affirmed a dismissal of a complaint which alleged that, "Because of
the negligence of defendant, plaintiff was deprived of the society,
companionship, services and support of her husband to her damage." The Court seeme4 to base that decision on the ground that
as no right of action existed in favor of married women under the
common law, it cannot now be claimed in the absence of a legislative grant. The plaintiff in the present case insisted that Franzen
v. Zimmerman did not settle the question of support alone. If the
question was not then settled, it seems clearly and distinctly established in the present case that the wife has no right of action
for loss of consortium or support even where the husband realizes
no such recovery for that loss.
Persons sympathetic with the idea of equality of spouses before the law will realize that in this decision the Colorado Court
2101 Colo. 258, 72 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

THIRD ED., p. 408; WORDS AND PHRASES. THIRD

SERiEs, p. 349.
'127 Colo. 381, 256 P. 2d 897 (1953).
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follows the great weight of authority which sustains the husband's
right to recover for loss due to the negligent injury to his wife,
but denies the wife a corresponding right in case of injury to her
husband.
JOHN PHILLIP LINN
TAXATION: INCOME FROM SOURCES WITHIN THE STATE
-The case of Arvey Corporationv. C. P. Fugate I arose as a result
of a previous action by the Arvey Corporation against the Julius
Hyman and Company.2 In that action, just as here, the Arvey Corporation sued on its own behalf and the behalf of its division
Velsicol Corporation.
The action out of which the instant case arose :3was an action
primarily to enjoin and restrain the manufacture and selling of
insecticides, and to require the defendants to account to the plaintiff for gains and profits resulting from the manufacture and sale
of such insecticides. Hyman was a vice-president and director
until February, 1947. Through his contractual obligations, Hyman
was to assign to Velsicol any invention or discovery made while so
employed. Differences arose which were not resolved and as a
result, Hyman resigned. A new Delaware Corporation was formed,
which was authorized to do business in Colorado and in February
of 1947 it began to manufacture insecticides in Colorado.
Upon trial in the District Court of the City and County of
Denver, an injunction was issued which determined that Velsicol
was entitled to recover from Hyman and Company all of the gains
and profits from the production and sale of Chlordane for the accounting period ended March 31, 1949.
Hyman and Company appealed and the trial court was affirmed.4 Shortly thereafter, the Director of Revenue of the State
of Colorado made a determination of tax liability against Velsicol
on the theory that the recovery in the prior case was income taxable under the laws of the State of Colorado. Velsicol filed its complaint against the Director of Revenue as an appeal from the final
determination of the deficiency income tax assessment in the district court of the City and County of Denver. The result of that
action is the subjdct of the present appeal.
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the decision of the
trial court in assessing the tax against Velsicol. The assessment
was made pursuant to COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 84A, § 3 (1935) which
is as follows:
Upon corporations, except those corporations described
in section 6 of this section, there shall be levied and collected and paid for each taxable year, a tax at the rate provided-in sub-section (2) of this section upon the net income
Director of Revenue of the State of Colorado.
-123 Colo. 562, 233 P. 2d 977 (1951).
3Ibid.
1

* Ibid.
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of every corporation derived from sources within this
state on or after the effective date of this Act. Income
from sources within this state includes income from tangible or intangible properties located or having a situs
in this state and income from any activities carried on in
this state, regardless of whether carried on intrastate,
interstate, or foreign commerce.
The Court states: "The precise question presented is whether
or not the monies received by Velsicol from the judgment, including the profit made by Hyman and Company, constitute 'income
derived from sources within this state' and as such is it subject
to tax ?" Velsicol contends that since it never was domiciled in the
State of Colorado, never had an office or representative here, and
has never carried on business in this state, it therefore never derived any income from sources within the State under the above
Act. It further contends that the situs of its right being an intangible, was at the place of domicile of the owner.
The Court answers Velsicol's first contention by holding that
the phrase "sources within this state" is all-inclusive and without
any limitation. It is not confined to business activities carried on
in this state, but rather covers any and all sources.
As to Velsicol's second contention, the Court states: "In the
matter of assessment as applied in income taxation, there appears
to be a business situs of intangibles which may be separate and
distinct from the domicile of the owner."
The monies recovered by Velsicol were admitted to be income.
If it were recovery of damages then it would not have been income
and would not have been taxable. The court states: "This admission is made by way of insisting that the real question here involved is one of jurisdiction to tax." In the last analysis, the
question seems rather simple, in that Velsicol is precluded by an
adjudication that the monies it received was income; that such
income constituted the profits from the operation of a Colorado
corporation, and therefore the source of the income was confined
strictly to Colorado.
Finally, it is held that Velsicol cannot accept the profits from
sources within the state and then rely on its status as a foreign
corporation to evade the tax thereon. Velsicol had stepped into the
shoes of Hyman and Company. For the reasons above stated the
trial court was affirmed.
In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court cites only one
case and distinguishes it. The case does not change the law as it
stands, but rather it extends the definition of the words of the
statute, "income from sources within the state". The case cited by
the Court is Cruse v. Clam and Coupling Company,5 which was
held not to be in point because of the difference of the 1937 statute,
as amended in 1943.
5113, Colo. 254, 156 P. 2d 397.
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The holding in this case may be rationalized solely on the
statute involved. The statute is found at section 2 (b) (1) chapter
196, page 453, S. L. 1951.0 The pertinent words therein are "income of every corporation derived from sources within this state."
The fact situation under which this case arose is such that it fits
the statute perfectly. Assume for a moment that Velsicol had not
had any action against Hyman and Company. In such a case, there
can be no doubt that Hyman and Company would be liable for the
tax under the statute. The source of that income, gain, or profit
was from sources within this state and clearly Hyman and Company would be liable therefor.
Now let us substitute Velsicol in place of Hyman and Company. By so doing, we are doing exactly what the lower court did
in allowing Velsicol to recover the gains and profits of Hyman and
Company. It should be noted that Velsicol has admitted that its
recovery was of gains and profits, or in the words of the statute,
the net income, of Hyman and Company. Velsicol, as the opinion
states, stepped into the shoes of Hyman and Company. By so doing, it subjects itself to liability for the corporation income tax.
The Court, by holding the phrase in question, all inclusive, has
precluded a corporation from successfully maintaining that since
it has conducted no business in Colorado it is not subject to income tax, if the income received was actually derived from a source
within the state. A source may apparently be any source from
which it is possible to derive income. If a foreign corporation
should recover income because of a right it holds against a Colorado Corporation it subjects itself to taxation. As above stated,
the holding seems entirely within the purview of the statute. It
also apears to be within the intent of the Legislature, as the rewording of the statute between the time of the Cruse case and the
instant case seems to indicate. The phrase was changed from
"business conducted within the state" to "sources within this
state". In merely comparing the two statutes and noting the
changes made, the legislative intent is clear. That intent was given
effect in the instant case.
GERALD F. GROSWOLD
'COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 84A § 3 (1935).
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